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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# REPORT

# INFORMATION REPORT

CD N.º.

DATE DISTR. 15 August 1955

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS.  
(LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. 25X1

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

1. The GDR delegation which was to go to Warsaw had been picked weeks before the beginning of the conference itself. By order of the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin, this delegation had to be reduced in size and persons who were eliminated included Vincenz Mueller, Heinz Kessler, and Paul Verner, as representatives of the KVP; Willi Saagebrecht of the State Planning Commission; Georg Handke, Fritz Grosse, Peter Florin, and Fred Oeliger as representatives of the Foreign Ministry and the SED Central Committee; Richard Staimer of the GST, and State Secretary Wollweber.
2. The Soviet Government modified its program for the solution of the German question and the further integration of the East Bloc states only one day prior to the beginning of the Warsaw conference. This modification came so unexpectedly that not even the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin had been informed of it. The great reserve exercised by Zhdanov and Pervukhin on occasion of their visit to Berlin on 8 May must be viewed in this light. These Soviet diplomats had tried to damp the exaggerated optimism of the SED leadership in the outcome of the Warsaw conference. It appears that the non-incorporation of the GDR in the defense system established in Warsaw was resolved upon in order to give the USSR a better bargaining position in the forthcoming four-power negotiations.
3. On 11 May, a preliminary discussion for the Warsaw conference took place under the leadership of Molotov. These discussions were attended by Ulbricht, Grotewohl, and Stoph and by the leaders of the satellite delegations. Molotov explained the modified Soviet attitude and the proposals made by his government. In his speech, the Soviet Foreign Minister stated that the ratification of the Paris agreements was bringing about a rapid reinforcement of Western aggressive forces. The new line taken by the Soviet Government was designed to stop this development and thus to avoid a further increase in international tensions. According to Molotov, this was the reason why the GDR was not militarily integrated into the Eastern Bloc system. The GDR was not allowed for the time being to form a national army. The SED was, however, to continue its propaganda campaign for the KVP and the GST. The USSR was willing to accept an invitation by the West for four-power negotiations and did not demand the scrapping of the Paris agreements prior to any negotiations on the German question. The Soviet disarmament proposal made on 10 May was to be the first point on the agenda of the forthcoming

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Approved For Release 2008/09/15 : CIA-RDP80-00810A003700010002

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four-power conference,<sup>1</sup> and the solution of the German question was to be coupled with general disarmament. The maintenance of smaller occupation forces in Germany in accordance with the Soviet peace plan of 10 May would create a favorable climate for future negotiations. Molotov furthermore said that the USSR would ~~insist~~ that Germany be given a status of armed neutrality and that the ~~demarcation~~ line be recognized as definite. Until the holding of free elections and the formation of an all-German government, West Germany and the GDR were to be included in an all-European security system and were to work for a reunification of the country within the framework of this system.

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4. The result of the Warsaw conference was disappointing for the GDR and the SED and it is generally believed to be a political defeat of the GDR Government in its relations to the East German population. The GDR delegates were criticized by the Poles and Czechs because their reports on the status of the East German rearmament program were believed to be grossly exaggerated.

1. Comment: It should be remembered that Molotov is quoted as having made these statements more than two months before the four-power conference actually took place.

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